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Abstract. Nothing new here—just a concise yet detailed presentation of the simple but inex-
orable algebra of sustainability.
“The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the long-
run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe has been pretty uniform. Nations,
like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called personal
credit, without assigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the
debt; and when this resource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon
assignments or mortgages of particular funds.” —Adam Smith (1776), An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book V, Ch. 3, ‘Of Public
Debts.’
Unsustainable debt paths may eventually lead to sharp adjustments if not to
crises—i.e., to generalised failure of economic agents to meet their obligations.
Hence, sustainability is a most desirable quality. The emphasis of this merely ex-
pository note shall be on the ex-post algebra of sustainability. While the ex-post
algebra of sustainability is rather straightforward, ex-ante analysis is not: the key
variables involved are either endogenous, uncertain, or both; expectations playing
a prominent role driving equilibria and, therefore, driving expectations themselves.
Nonetheless, the simple ex-post algebra of sustainability provides a useful frame-
work to identify vulnerabilities and risks—after all, a most fertile source for insight
is hindsight.
1. Simple Algebra of Fiscal Sustainability
Indicators of fiscal sustainability are constructed to shed light on the following
question:1
“Can the current course of fiscal policy be sustained, without exploding debt? Or
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Marques and Ernesto Ramı´rez for useful comments.
1 O.J. Blanchard (1990), “Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators,” OECD Dept. of Eco-
nomics and Statistics Working Paper no. 79. Available from http://www.oecd.org and reprinted
in H.A.A. Verbon and F.A.A.M. van Winden (editors), The Political Economy of Government
Debt, New York: North-Holland.
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will the government have to sharply increase taxes, decrease spending, have recourse
to monetisation, or even repudation?”
Let Dt denote the stock of government debt at the end of year t, let it be the
(average) nominal interest rate, Bt the primary (i.e., non-interest) government bal-
ance (Bt > 0 means that the government runs a surplus), and let Mt denote the
end-of-period stock of high-powered money. The government budget constraint
implies that:
Dt = (1 + it)Dt−1 −Bt −∆Mt (1)
= Dt−1 − (Bt − itDt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Overall Balance
− ∆Mt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seignorage
(2)
Equation (1) always holds ex-post. It simply states that the government meets its
debt obligations, and that any gap, Bt < 0, must either be financed by new debt,
or monetised, or a mix of the two. In contrast, a surplus, Bt > 0, can be used to
reduce the stock of existing debt or the stock of money—e.g., see the flow of funds
displayed in Table 1.
Note that any gross amortization due during t will require a rollover unless a
government surplus—i.e., (B + ∆M) > 0—allows for a net amortization effectively
reducing the debt stock. For example, assume that a portion α of D−1 comes due
and that (B + ∆M) = 0, then we’d have D = [1 + αi + (1 − α)i−1]D−1, which
simplifies to D = (1 + i)D−1 when i = i−1.2
It is useful to normalise the quantities in equation (1) by some measure of
the government’s ability to service and repay its debt—e.g., government revenues,
GDP, exports in the case of external debt, etc. The most common choice used for
normalising government debt is GDP. Dividing equation (1) by nominal GDP, PtYt,
results in:
Dt
PtYt
=
(1 + it)Dt−1
PtYt
− Bt
PtYt
− ∆Mt
PtYt
(3)
=
(1 + it)
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
(
Dt−1
Pt−1Yt−1
)
− Bt
PtYt
− ∆Mt
PtYt
(4)
where gt is the real growth rate and pit is the inflation rate (measured as the rate
of change of the GDP deflator, P ).
Use lowercase symbols to denote ratios to GDP and ∆mt for seignorage, to rewrite
(4), and obtain the law of motion of the government debt-to-GDP ratio:
dt =
(1 + it)
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
dt−1 − (bt + ∆mt) (5)
2 The trick in equation (1) is to define it−1 implictly as an effective rate. See also W. Easterly and
S. Fischer (1990), “The Economics of the Government Budget Constraint,” World Bank Research
Observer, 5:2, 127–42.
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=
(
1 + rt
1 + gt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕt
dt−1 − (bt + ∆mt) (6)
= ϕtdt−1 − (bt + ∆mt) (7)
where rt is the real interest rate,3 and ϕt is a discount factor defined as ϕt = (1+rt)÷
(1 + gt). Equation (7) is also our fundamental fiscal-sustainability identity. It will
always hold, as it is simply derived from accounting identities, with no behavioral
assumptions intervening.4 For notational simplicity, from now on we shall drop the
seignorage—i.e., whenever be encounter b from now on it is understood that any
seignorage, ∆m, must be added to it.
Solving (7) recursively (Appendix 5.2) we obtain:
dt = d0
t∏
i=1
ϕi −
t∑
i=1
bi
t∏
j=i+1
ϕj (8)
If we wish to use this equation in a forward-looking analysis—say, looking ahead
over a period of 5 years or longer—we can assume constant balances and discount
factors, which can then be interpreted as averages, to simplify (8). In this context,
by dropping the time subscripts in ϕ and b, we obtain:
dt = d0ϕt − b
t−1∑
i=0
ϕi (9)
Equation (9) can be used for different exercises. Assume, e.g., that there is a
target of debt ratio, d¯, to be achieved by time T . Then the required average
primary surplus (plus seignorage) can be obtained by simply solving for b. A polar
case to consider is when the real interest rate equals the growth rate, ϕ = 1, then
solving equation (9) becomes: b = (d0 − d¯)/T so that the primary balance plus
seignorage must fill one-T th of the gap each year. For a general ϕ > 1, the annual
effort must now be larger than that:
b =
d0ϕ
T − d¯∑T−1
i=0 ϕ
i
>
d0 − d¯
T
(10)
Of course, (10) characterises only one of many possible paths that lead to the desired
debt ratio in T years: the path with identical surplus as a percent to GDP during
the adjustment period—the smoother path in this sense.
3 The real interest rate is given by r = (i−pi)÷(1+pi), which is safely approximated by r ≈ i−pi,
when both i and pi are not large (e.g., smaller than 10%).
4 Note, however, that, ex ante, ϕt is an endogenous factor, jointly determined with bt and ∆mt.
However, since no behavioural modelling is attempted here, we shall simply take ϕt as given.
3
Explosive Debt-Dynamics. In forward-looking analysis, the most common assump-
tion is to have a positive interest-growth differential, rt > gt. If the interest-growth
differential is positive, then the debt ratio will blow up unless the last term in equa-
tion (7), bt, is large enough to compensate. Refer to equation (9). Assume now that
ϕ > 1; in order to stay in a non-explosive path, we need that eventually (sooner
rather than later): b > 0—i.e., that the government runs a large enough primary
surplus.
1.1. Stabilising Debt-to-GDP Ratios
Substract dt−1 on both sides of equation (6) to obtain an expression for the change
in the debt ratio:
∆dt =
(
rt − gt
1 + gt
)
· dt−1 − bt (11)
Note that if real growth, g, is zero, then the change in the debt ratio is driven
by the operational balance—i.e., the overall government balance less the inflation
component of interest payments, pid.5
If we want to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio, make zero the left-hand side of
equation (11) and solve for b to obtain the debt-stabilising balance:
b∗t =
(
rt − gt
1 + gt
)
· dt−1 (12)
which is the required government primary surplus (including seignorage). A larger
surplus, bt > b∗t , will bring the debt ratio down.
The larger is the (real) interest-growth differential, (rt−gt), the larger the required
debt-stabilising surplus. Note that if the interest-growth differential is zero, rt = gt,
then it follows from (11) that ∆dt = −bt. In this context, a balanced primary keeps
the debt-to-GDP ratio constant.
Note that while the left-hand side of equation (12) displays the primary balance,
what finally matters for the debt dynamics is the overall balance. The overall
balance is what ultimately determines the change in the debt stock—i.e.,
from equation (2), we have that
∆Dt = − (Bt − itDt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Overall Balance
(13)
When we are dealing with ratios to GDP, then there is an additional a growth
‘dividend’ term driving the debt dynamics. Let’s start out with a version of equation
5 See Vito Tanzi, M.I. Blejer and M.O. Tejeiro (1993), “Effects of Inflation on Measurement of
Fiscal Deficits: Conventional vs Operational Measures,” in M.I. Blejer and A. Cheastey (editors),
How to Measure the Fiscal Deficit, Washington: IMF.
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(11) that uses nominal rates of interest, it, and nominal growth, γt = gt+pit+ gtpit,
given by:
∆dt =
it − γt
1 + γt
dt−1 − bt (14)
=
it − γt
1 + γt
dt−1 − (bt − itdt−1)− itdt−1 (15)
= − (bt − itdt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
overall balance
− 1 + it
1 + γt
γtdt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth dividend
(16)
It becomes apparent that when nominal growth, γ, is zero, the change in the debt ra-
tio is simply driven by the government overall balance—cf. equation (11) expressed
for real rates of interest and growth.
1.2. Cashflow, liquidity and rollover risk
While equation (13) determines the evolution of the stock of debt, it is also impor-
tant to pay attention to the gross debt issuance, which depends not only on the
government balance but also on the amortizations, At.
Dt = (Dt−1 −At)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Old Debt
+ [At − (Bt − itDt−1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
New Debt Issued
(17)
Thus, the gross issuance of debt depends on the debt service, (A+ iD−1), and the
primary balance, B. Or, equivalently, on the overall balance, (B − iD−1), and the
amortizations, A.
1.3. Sustainable Fiscal Policy
At any given time s, the net present value of the stream of all the future payments,
both of principal and interest, p = {ps, ps+1, ps+2, . . .}, discounted by the nominal
rate i = r + pi + ipi, is given by:6
D(p, r, pi) =
∞∑
t=s
pt
[(1 + pi)(1 + r)]t−s
(18)
Since we used before Ds to denote the market value of debt, in equilibrium we
must have D(p, r, pi) = Ds. Equation (18) shows, for example, that a raise in the
country’s sovereign risk that increases r will unequivocally decrease D(p, r, pi)—i.e.,
the market value of the government’s debt declines. The other side of the coin is
that now a given stream of future payments raises less funds for the government.
6 At s there is a set of prevailing interest rates for government debt issues at different maturities.
Here, however, for the sake of simplicity we shall use a single (average) rate, r, constant over s.
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We can similarly compute the net present value of a stream of primary surpluses,
B(b, r, pi). Fiscal policy is sustainable if the government’s solvency con-
dition is satisfied. The solvency condition requires the equalisation of the net
present value of primary surpluses and debt obligations:7
D(p, r, pi) = B(b, r, pi) (19)
As we shall discuss below, the upper bound for the time index in the primary-
balances net-present-value sum is a crucial assumption. Making t → ∞ in (19)
allows for the public debt to be simply serviced with no need to be entirely paid
out.
As Robert Eisner states: “. . . the notion that the debt incurred by current gener-
ations has somehow to be paid off eventually by future generations is a confusing,
or confused, effort to use a mathematical principle of solvency where it does not
apply.”8 In a growing economy there is no reason why the public debt ever has to
be paid out entirely. At the heart of the government’s solvency condition is only
the requirement of a non-explosive debt ratio, all or part of the existing debt could
always be rolled over. As we shall see below, simply stabilising the debt ratio does
satisfy the government’s solvency condition (19).
Assume that primary balances evolve over time in line with nominal GDP growth,
Bt = (1 + g)(1 + pi)B, so that the balance as a percent-to-GDP remains constant,
bt = B/Ys = b. The net present value of this stream of primary balances from
t = s+ 1 on, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is given by
B
Ys
∞∑
t=s+1
[
(1 + pi)(1 + g)
(1 + pi)(1 + r)
]t−s
=
1 + g
1 + r
b
∞∑
t=s
(
1 + g
1 + r
)t−s
=
1 + g
r − g b (20)
The solvency condition requires equating this net present value to the current debt
ratio, ds, which gives: ds = b(1 + g)/(r − g). This equation can be solved for b:
b˜ =
(
r − g
1 + g
)
· ds (21)
Equation (21) is identical to equation (12), which determines the required balance
to mantain a stable the debt-to-GDP ratio, b∗. The constant primary surplus
required for solvency never brings the debt ratio to zero, it simply stabilises it.9
7 In a money-dominant regime, the solvency condition is satisfied by adjustments in the sequence
of fiscal balances, b. On the contrary, in a fiscal-dominant regime, where the sequence b is assumed
to be given, it is the inflation rate, pi that adjusts to satisfy the solvency condition. Note, however,
that when (18) is taken as an equilibrium condition, rational expectations will rule out ad hoc
revaluations of the debt stock, which can only follow after genuine shocks.
8 R. Eisner (1994), The Misunderstood Economy: What Counts and How to Count It, Boston
MA: Harvard University Press, [Page 126].
9 Of course, alternatively, we could have a constant primary, b∗ over T years to bring the debt
ratio to a target d¯ ≥ 0—using equation (10) to determine b∗—and then switch to b¯—determined
by equation (12)—from T + 1 onwards to stabilise it. If we make d¯ = 0 the public debt is then
paid off by time T .
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The ‘missundertood’ solvency requirement truncates the sum in (20) at a terminal
T—requiring that the public debt be completely paid off by then.
2. Government Debt in an Open Economy
So far we haven’t been too specific about what exactly is the interest rate, i. We
think of i as an effective interest rate on government debt. When a substantial
portion of debt is denominated in foreign currency, we must take into account the
debt composition and exchange rate movements.
Let’s return to equation (4), we must worry about two things now. One is the
effective interest on government debt, which will be a weighted average of domes-
tic and foreign rates, and exchange-rate movements. Consequently, the nominal
exchange rate will play a crucial role here. We must also acknowledge that the
inflation rate (i.e., the change in the GDP deflator) will be determined by domes-
tic inflation for the non-tradable sector and by world inflation and exchange-rate
movements for the tradable sector.
2.1. Foreign-denominated Debt
Let’s use an f -superscript to denote foreign-denominated variables and h-superscript
to denote (home) domestically-denominated variables. Let e be the exchange rate
in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. We have that:
D = Dh + eDf (22)
Let αf be the portion of foreign-denominated government debt, αf = et−1D
f
t−1/Dt−1,
and αh = 1−αf the portion of foreign-denominated debt (both computed at the end
of the previous period). The debt-dynamics equation (1) now becomes (Appendix
5.3):
Dt = [1 + αhiht + α
f (ift + εt + i
f
t εt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it
]Dt−1 − (Bt + ∆Mt) (23)
where εt = ∆et/et−1 is the rate of depreciation of the local currency (i.e., εt > 0
means depreciation). The effective nominal interest rate is given now by a weighted
average of domestic rates and a term involving foreign rates and exchange-rate
movements:10
it = αhiht + α
f (ift + εt + i
f
t εt) (24)
which makes readily apparent how movements in the exchange rate may affect the
debt burden. (The third term within the parentheses will generally be rather small
and sometimes it is dropped to simplify expressions.) Define a weighted average of
10 For simplicity, we have only one foreign country here, if itself will be generally substituted by
a weighted average of foreign rates, ifj ’s, where the j index runs over foreign creditor countries.
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domestic and foreign interest rates as ıˆt = αhiht + α
f ift , then we can rewrite (24)
as:
it = ıˆt + εtαf (1 + i
f
t ). (24′)
Thus, the effective interest rate has two components: (1) a weighted average of
domestic and foreign interest rates, ıˆ; and (2) the exchange-rate induced valuation
gains or losses in the foreign-debt obligations. This second element may grow to be
substantial during an exchange-rate crisis.
2.2. Composition of GDP: Tradable and Non-Tradable Sectors
Consider equation (3) where the government’s current budget constraint (1) was
divided by nominal GDP. Now movements in the exchange rate will produce price
changes in the tradable sector. Let’s use the superscripts f and h to denote the
tradable and nontradable sectors, respectively. Then nominal GDP is expressed as:
PY = PhY h + eP fY f (25)
As before, define βh = Pht−1Y
h
t−1/Pt−1Yt−1 as the share of the non-tradable sector,
and βf = 1− βh, as the share of the tradable sector, then:
PtYt = (1 + gt)[1 + βhpiht + β
f (pift + εt + εtpi
f
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
pit
)]Pt−1Yt−1 (26)
(see Appendix 5.4), so that now:
pit = βhpiht + β
f (pift + εt + εtpi
f
t ) (27)
= pˆit + εtβf (1 + pi
f
t ) (27′)
where pˆit = βhpiht + β
fpift is a weighted average of domestic and foreign inflation
rates.11 Compare equation (27′) with equation (24′). In an open economy, the
inflation rate has two components: (1) a weighted average of domestic and foreign
inflation rates, pˆi; and (2) the exchange-rate induced valuation gains or losses in the
tradable-sector output.
11 For long-term analysis, we must also acknowledge that tradable and non-tradable sectors may
grow at different rates, gt = βht g
h
t + β
f
t g
f
t , altering the next period β’s.
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2.3. Putting it all Together
We can still use our fundamental sustainability equation (5)—as well as all the
subsequent equations in the previous section—but now we must keep in mind that
it and pit are defined by equations (24) and (27). Consequently, exchange-rate
movements, ε 6= 0, play a prominent role in debt dynamics. We have:
dt =
1 + rt
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
dt−1 − bt (5)
it = ıˆt + εtαf (1 + i
f
t ) (24′)
pit = pˆit + εtβf (1 + pi
f
t ) (27′)
These equations can be combined to obtain:
dt =
1 + ıˆt + εtαf (1 + i
f
t )
(1 + gt)[1 + pˆit + εtβf (1 + pi
f
t )]
dt−1 − bt (28)
Substracting dt−1 from both sides of equation (28) yields:12
∆dt =
{
1 + ıˆt + εtαf (1 + i
f
t )
(1 + gt)[1 + pˆit + εtβf (1 + pi
f
t )]
− 1
}
· dt−1 − bt (29)
In this context, with foreign and domestic inflation, one could define a real interest
rate, ρ as:
1 + ρt =
1 + ıˆt + εtαf (1 + i
f
t )
1 + pˆit + εtβf (1 + pi
f
t )
which implies
ρt =
(ˆıt − pˆit) + εt[αf (1 + ift )− βf (1 + pift )]
1 + pˆit + εtβf (1 + pi
f
t )
and then rewrite equation (29) as:
∆dt =
(
ρt − gt
1 + gt
)
· dt−1 − bt (30)
12 The Excel spreadsheet developed by the IMF’s Policy Development Review department for
assesing fiscal sustainability makes βf ≈ 0 and further assumes that if ≈ ıˆ to write (29) as:
∆dt ≈
{
1 + ıˆt + εtαf (1 + ıˆt)
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
− 1
}
dt−1 − bt
See “Assessing Sustainability,” Paper prepared by the IMF Policy Development Review Depart-
ment, May 2002, SM/02/166. Available from http://www.imf.org.
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which is analogous to (11).
Finally, note that all the variables—i.e., nominal interest, inflation and growth
rates—involved in the discount factors ϕt = (1 + it)÷ [(1 + gt)(1 +pit)], are endoge-
nously determined, and uncertain ex-ante. Obviously, interest and growth rates
are interconnected. In addition, market expectations may push up a country’s risk
premium, increasing it to levels that turn any given situation unsustainable. A
vicious cycle may start, and self-fullfilling expectations may lead an economy to a
bad equilibrium possibly involving a sharp adjustment or, worse, a crisis.
2.4. More on Exchange-Rate Movements
Exchange-rate movements have three immediate effects: (i) they affect the domestic
cost of servicing interest of foreign-denominated debt, (ii) they affect the value in
domestic currency of the foreign-denominated debt, and (iii) they affect the value
of GDP in domestic currency through changes in prices in the tradable sector.
Since the debt ratio involves foreign-denominated variables both in the numerator
and denominator,
d =
Dh + eDf
PhY h + eP fY f
(31)
movements in the exchange rate, e, will immediately affect d.13
If (Dh/eDf ) = (PhY h/eP fY f ) so that the composition of debt and output are
perfectly matched (i.e., αf = βf ), then movements in the exchange rate, e, will not
affect sustainability directly via changes in d.14
When αf > βf , an exchange depreciation may have severe effects on sustainabil-
ity. In an extreme case, if the tradable sector is negligible (βf → 0), exchange rate
depreciation will have maximum effects on d.
3. External-Debt Sustainability
While fiscal-sustainability analysis looks at the ‘Government’ column in the Flow of
Funds table, external sustainability focuses on the ‘Rest of the World’ column (Table
1). Similarly to the government accumulating public debt because its revenues fall
short of its expenditures, a country accumulates external debt when it has a current
account deficit: the country spends more than its national income (Appendix 5.1).
The algebra of external-debt sustainability is formally quite similar to the anal-
ysis of fiscal sustainability. There is, however, a difference in presentation; in this
13 G. Calvo, A. Izquierdo, and E. Talvi (2003), “Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and
Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina’s Lessons,” NBER Working Paper No. w9828. Available from
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9828
14 Note that for (a+ ∆a)÷ (b+ ∆b) = a÷ b we must have that ∆a÷∆b = a÷ b.
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Table 1. Schematic Flow of Funds
Domestic Economy
(1) = (2) + (3) + (4)
Govern- Private Banking Rest of
ment Sector System the World
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gross National Domestic Income Y Yg Yp
⊕ Final Consumption −C −Cg −Cp
⊕ Gross Investment −I −Ig −Ip
⊕ Exports of Goods & Nonfactor Serv. −X
	 Imports of Goods & Nonfactor Serv. M
⊕ Net Factor Income −Yf
⊕ Net Transfers −Yr
0. Non-Financial Balances (S − I) (Sg − Ig) (Sp − Ip) 0 CAB
1. Domestic Financing
1.1. Monetary Financing
1.1.1. Money ∆M −∆M2 ∆M2−∆M
1.1.2. Domestic Credit ∆NDCg ∆NDCp −∆NDC
1.2. Non-Monetary Financing
1.2.1. Non-Bank Financing NB −NB
2. Foreign Financing
2.1. Monetary Financing
2.1.1. Change in Net Foreign Assets −∆NFA −∆NFA ∆NFA
2.2. Non-Monetary Financing
2.2.1. Direct Investment FDI FDI −FDI
2.2.2. Net Foreign Borrowing NFB NFBg NFBp −NFB
Vertical Check (0− (1 + 2)) = 0 0 0 0 0
context, it is customary to express all variables in U.S. dollars (USD).15
Let Dt denote the stock of all (public and private) external debt expressed in
USD. The analogue to the law of motion of the debt stock (1) is now the country’s
budget constraint in relation to the rest of the world:
Dt = (1 + i
f
t )Dt−1 − CAt (32)
where CAt is the non-interest current account balance. Output shall be expressed
in USD too:
PY/e = PhY h/e+ P fY f (25′)
and we define the tradable and non-tradable sector shares, βf and βh, as before.
15 Not coincidentaly, the U.S. is one of the few countries whose flow of funds table shows a signif-
icant nonzero entry on holdings of domestic currency by foreign residents—i.e., row 1.1.1 in the
last column.
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The equation analogue to (11) and (29) now becomes:
∆dt =
{
1 + ıˆt + ξtαh(1 + iht )
(1 + gt)[1 + pˆit + ξtβh(1 + piht )]
− 1
}
· dt−1 − cat (33)
where ξ is the rate of change of the inverse of the exchange rate (1/e), and αh = (1−
αf ) is the portion of domestic debt in total debt. This equation makes apparent that
a key variable for external sustainability is the current-account balance, ca. It plays
the same role that the government primary balance played for fiscal sustainability.
4. Other Issues
While this note deals with ex-post identities, sustainability analysis is inherently
forward-looking, and endogeneity plays a central role. In particular, some of the
things to keep in mind: (i) the interest rate is not independently determined from
the stock of debt; (ii) the growth rate depends, in turn, on the interest rate; and
(iii) foreign and domestic interest rates will not be determined independently.
When doing cross-country comparisons of debt-to-GDP ratios, we must keep in
mind that both revenue-to-GDP ratios and the revenue composition also vary sub-
stantially. Therefore, we must also take into account tax-to-GDP ratios (and pos-
sibly other measures) for assesing sustainability. The same applies to external sus-
tainability, the more open the economy and the larger the tradable sector, the easier
to adjust rapidly.
The stock of present debt ignores contingent government liabilities. Private debt
may suddenly become a public liability. In the event of a systemic banking crisis,
for example, recapitalization of the banking system can greatly increase government
debt. Some authors have emphasized that an economic definition for ‘debt’ ought
to be used instead of the legal definition that is usually employed.
Some authors have wisely emphasised the need to also take a long-term perspec-
tive and focus on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, (19): “Today’s
long-run becomes tomorrow’s short-run.”16 Nonetheless, from a pragmatic point of
view, the danger of shifting the focus to infinite net-present-value sums is that the
short-run can easily become unimportant and, hence, ignored. Since, in turn, the
long-run is decidedly determined by all past short-run’s, this approach, if narrowly
understood, could unintentionally lead to a series of imprudent short-run’s wishfully
compensated by perpetually shifted-away corrections.
16 W.H. Buiter (1995), “Measuring Fiscal Sustainability,” mimeo, Cambridge University. Available
from /www.nber.org/∼wbuiter/sustain.pdf.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Basic Macro Indentities and the Twin Deficits
The most basic macro identity equates aggregate supply to aggregate demand:
Q+M︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Supply
= R+
Final Demand︷ ︸︸ ︷
(C + I +X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Demand
, (34)
where Q denotes total output, R denotes intermediate consumption, M are imports,
X denotes exports, C is aggregate consumption and I denotes aggregate investment.
The gross domestic product, GDP , is defined as:
GDP = (Q−R) = C + I + (X −M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade Balance
(35)
If we add to GDP net factor foreign income Yf and net transfers from abroad Yr
we obtain domestic income, Y ,
Y = GDP + Yf + Yr (36)
= C + I + (X −M) + Yf + Yr︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAB
, (37)
where CAB is the current-account balance. Rearranging, we have that:
CAB = Y − (C − I) = (S − I), (38)
that is, the CAB is determined by the aggregate saving-investment balance. When
domestic demand exceeds domestic income, the CAB must be negative. Decompos-
ing the national saving-investment balance into the private-sector balance, (Sp−Ip)
and the government-sector balance, (Sg − Ig) = (T −G), where T denotes govern-
ment revenues and G government expenditures, we obtain:
CAB = (Sp − Ip) + (T −G). (39)
Equation (39) makes apparent the impact of the public-sector deficit on the current
account (i.e., the so-called twin deficits). Rearranging terms in (39) we obtain
−(T −G) = (Sp − Ip)− CAB, or:
(G− T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Budget Deficit
= (Sp − Ip)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Private Sector Balance
+ CAD︸ ︷︷ ︸
CA Deficit
(40)
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5.2. Derivation of Equation (8)
Starting at time 0, applying (6) recursively we obtain:
d1 = ϕ1d0 − b1 (41)
d2 = ϕ2d1 − b2 (42)
= ϕ2[ϕ1d0 − b1]− b2 (43)
= ϕ2ϕ1d0 − ϕ2b1 − b2 (44)
d3 = ϕ3d2 − b3 (45)
= ϕ3[ϕ2ϕ1d0 − ϕ2b1 − b2]− b3 (46)
= ϕ3ϕ2ϕ1d0 − ϕ3ϕ2b1 − ϕ3b2 − b3 (47)
...
dt = d0
t∏
j=1
ϕj −
t∑
j=1
bj
t∏
i=j+1
ϕi (48)
Where it is understood that a sum over an empty index set is equal to zero, and a
product over an empty index set is equal to 1.
5.3. Derivation of Equation (23)
Dt = (1 + iht )D
h
t−1 + (1 + i
f
t )etD
f
t−1 − (Bt + ∆Mt) (49)
= (1 + iht )D
h
t−1 + (1 + εt)(1 + i
f
t )et−1D
f
t−1 − (Bt + ∆Mt) (50)
= [αh(1 + iht ) + α
f (1 + εt)(1 + i
f
t )]Dt−1 − (Bt + ∆Mt) (51)
= [1 + αhiht + α
f (ift + εt + i
f
t εt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it
]Dt−1 − (Bt + ∆Mt) (23)
5.4. Derivation of Equation (26)
PtYt = (1 + gt)[(1 + piht )P
h
t−1Y
h
t−1 + (1 + εt)(1 + pi
f
t )et−1P
f
t−1Y
f
t−1] (52)
= (1 + gt)[(1 + piht )β
h + (1 + εt)(1 + pi
f
t )β
f ]Pt−1Yt−1 (53)
= (1 + gt)[(βh + βf ) + βhpiht + β
f (pift + εt + εtpi
f
t )]Pt−1Yt−1 (54)
= (1 + gt)[1 + βhpiht + β
f (pift + εt + εtpi
f
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
pit
)]Pt−1Yt−1 (26)
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5.5. Pesky Details on the Dynamics of Deficit and Debt
In order to compute debt paths, we must link flows and stocks in discrete time—
e.g., in monthly or annual intervals. While the overall balance will include payments
on new debt, the change in debt, in turns, will depend on the size of the overall
balance:
OBt = Bt − [it−1Dt−1 + it∆Dt] (55)
∆Dt = OBt (56)
which implies:
∆Dt = OBt = (1 + it)[Bt − it−1Dt−1]. (57)
Equation (57) assumes, however, that all new debt is issued at the beginning of
the period t. It basically says that the government must finance the gap between
revenues and expenditures plus the interest payments on the gap itself.
In the absence of detailed cashflow projections, a better assumption for long
periods (e.g., a quarter or longer), is that the debt is issued uniformly along the
duration of the period. In this case, on average, the stock of the net increase in
debt is given by ∆Dt/2, so that equation (57) becomes:
∆Dt =
(
1 +
it
2
)
[Bt − it−1Dt−1]. (58)
Finally, there is the issue that some of the old debt will be amortized duing t
and any new debt issued to roll over those obligations may carry a different interest
rate, it. Assume that a portion αt of the existing debt is amortized in t,17 then
equation (58) becomes:
∆Dt =
(
1 +
it
2
)
{Bt − [(1− αt)it−1 + αtit]Dt−1}. (59)
For the sake of notational simplicity, all these details were ignored throughout
the main body of the handout. Nonetheless, they may be rather important for
empirical analyses, especially when the sovereign spreads change and the interest
on newly-issued debt differs significantly from the interest on old debt.
TEXed on July 17, 2010 at 7:21 P.M. by E. LEY
17 Note that this portion is a weighted average of durations and amounts—i.e., as before, 10
percent of the debt amortized in January or December have distinct consequences if it−1 and it
are sufficiently different.
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